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In a paper published in an earlier issue of this journal (Ben-Yami 2009b) I argued that 
the approach which construes natural language quantifiers that are one-place 
determiners as binary generalized quantifiers has failed to explain why they are, 
according to it, restricted. I have also concisely developed there an alternative, 
Aristotelian-Geachean approach, which, I tried to show, explains both this feature of 
natural language quantifiers and the mentioned failure of the generalized quantifiers 
approach. I maintained that the ability of competing theories to supply an explanation 
of this phenomenon should be a criterion for deciding between them. 
 Professor Westerståhl replies to my paper (2010), arguing that my alternative 
approach is problematic and that it fails to improve on the generalized quantifiers one 
in explaining restriction. I shall try in this response to clarify the relevant aspects of 
my approach and why it does supply, as I claimed earlier, an improved explanation. 
 Let me first note, however, that an important part of my paper was devoted to 
criticising attempts by developers of the generalized quantifiers analysis of natural 
language quantifiers to explain why the latter are restricted. I presented and rejected 
(pp. 316-18) explanations suggested by Keenan and Stavi (1986, §2.7), Keenan (1996, 
p. 56) and Keenan and Westerståhl (1997, p. 852). In his reply, Westerståhl does not 
try to answer my criticisms, most of which he doesn’t even mention. I take it as an 
indication that he found my criticisms conclusive. And indeed, later in his reply 
(§ 6.3) he explicitly adopts ‘a more empirical view’: restriction, he writes, ‘may point 
to features of the language faculty in the human brain. Maybe a language with 
unrestricted quantification could never evolve with beings like us.’ Westerståhl’s 
view, that we might need to abandon any attempt to explain restriction on semantic 
principles, is surely a significant result of my paper. 
 Yet Westerståhl is not consistent in this view: near the end of his paper he 
writes that his ‘guess is that with the semantic tools we have so far been using, no 
further explanation of quantifier restriction should be expected. To go deeper, we 
would need a richer framework.’ He gestures towards a paper by Fernando (2001), 
‘which is quite technical [and] leads up to an intricate explanation of conservativity’, 
but he does not pursue this suggestion any further in his reply. I hope my simple 
explanation will obviate the need for technical intricacies or recourse to brain 
sciences. 
 A central concept I use in developing my alternative approach is that of plural 
reference. But although Westerståhl has some difficulties with this concept (§ 2), I 
shall not defend it here. It goes back to Russell’s ‘the class as many’ (1903); it 
reappears in Strawson’s ‘On Referring’ and Geach’s Reference and Generality; and 
then again in Black (1971), Armstrong (1978), Boolos (1984), Lewis (1991) and 
others. This is probably as much authority as one could wish for in analytic 
philosophy.1 The basic idea is, however, simple: if we can use an expression to refer 
                                                 
1 For recent developments, clarification and defence of the idea of plural reference see (Ben-Yami 
2004, Part I), (Yi 2005-6, Part I), (McKay 2006, Chaps. 1, 2). 
 None of the philosophical literature on plural quantification is mentioned in Peters and 
Westerståhl’s 528-page book of 2006, a book which discusses, as its title declares, Quantifiers in 
to a single individual, we can surely also use expressions to refer to more than a 
single individual. While ‘my daughter’, when I use it, refers to that one person, 
namely my daughter, ‘my children’ similarly refers to two persons, namely my 
daughter and my son. ‘He’, as demonstrative, is used to refer to a single individual, 
while ‘they’ is so used to refer to more than a single individual. It is hard to see what 
could be unclear in this idea. 
 The clarity of the idea and the apparent existence of plural referring phrases in 
natural language made philosophers attempt, in recent decades, to incorporate plural 
reference into logic and semantics. The need for such incorporation became clearer 
once Boolos (1984) and others noted various valid inferences in natural language that 
employ plural referring expressions and cannot be captured by standard versions of 
the predicate calculus. My approach can be seen as part of this attempt.2 
 A fresh look at model-theoretic semantics reveals something peculiar at its 
foundations: the universe or model, the domain over which we quantify, remains 
unspecified by what we say. The truth conditions of a quantified sentence are a 
function of its domain, but—assuming model-theoretic semantics gives the correct 
semantics of natural language—speakers never say what this domain is. This seems 
unadvisable, for misinterpretations might easily arise. On the other hand, it seems we 
are not familiar from our daily discourse with such misunderstandings. Something 
must have gone wrong in our analysis of natural language, but what? 
 The answer is, the lack of plural referring expressions from the calculus. Let 
us consider a quantified subject–predicate sentence, ‘q S are P’, where q is a 
quantifier. From his Begriffsschrift on, Frege has interpreted the grammatical subject 
term S in such sentences as logically predicative (see, for instance (1892: 197-8)). All 
general terms are, according to him, logically predicative; only singular terms can be 
logical subject terms.3 This made it impossible for Frege to specify a plurality by 
means of any expression in language. The plurality over which we quantify remains 
unspecified in Fregean logic. 
 For Frege himself this was not a drawback, as in his semantics the domain is 
always the universal domain. But with the emergence of model-theoretic semantics 
with its variable domains, the difficulty came into being: a semantics which 
essentially involves an unmentioned—or even ineffable?—domain. If the domain is 
that important, why not specify it? 
 The answer is that natural language of course does specify its ‘domain’. By 
contrast to the predicate logic, natural language has plural referring expressions, 
which it uses to specify the plurality over which we quantify. In a sentence of the 
form ‘q S are P’ the grammatical subject term S is used as a plural referring 
expression, determining the plurality over which we quantify. For instance, if I say, 
when discussing an exam I gave, ‘Most students arrived on time’, I use ‘students’ to 
refer to the students that took my exam; and I use the quantifier ‘most’ to specify to 
how many of them the predicate, ‘arrived on time’, applies. 
 Since quantification necessarily involves a plurality over which we quantify, it 
is most natural that we should have expressions to specify that plurality, as indeed 
                                                                                                                                            
Language and Logic, and whose aim ‘is to give a comprehensive picture of the whole area of 
quantification’ (p. viii). The idea of plural reference is mentioned on pages 1-3 of the book, first to say 
that the book will not cover this topic and then to cast doubt on its importance to the semantics of 
quantification. 
2 For a comparison of my approach to other approaches in plural logic, those which follow Boolos, see 
(Ben-Yami 2009a). 
3 For a presentation and criticisms of Frege’s arguments for his position, see (Ben-Yami 2006). 
natural language has. Only the lack of plural referring expressions from the predicate 
calculus made logicians blind to the mentioned function of the grammatical subject 
term, and brought them to misinterpret it as logically predicative. 
 Westerståhl practically agrees (§ 2) that once we interpret the subject term S as 
a plural referring expression, natural language quantifiers turn out to be necessarily 
‘restricted’. And I hope I have clearly explained above why this interpretation is not 
built in by ‘a mere stipulation’ but ‘for independent principled reasons’ (§ 6.3). This is 
therefore a significant advantage over the generalized quantifiers approach of the 
approach that interprets the grammatical subject term S in ‘q S are P’ as a plural 
referring expression. The inverted commas around ‘restricted’ above are due to the 
fact that the interpretation of natural language quantifiers as restricted, in the sense 
this term has within the logic of generalized quantifiers, is applicable only if we 
construe the former as binary generalized quantifiers, a construal I of course reject. A 
different explanation of restriction, independent of this construal, is given below, 
quoted from Westerståhl. I shall briefly present there my explanation of restriction; 
but first a few more words on domains of discourse. 
 As I explicitly noted in my earlier paper (p. 321) and as could be seen above, 
according to my approach natural language has no domain of discourse in the 
technical sense of predicate logic semantics, namely, an unspecified but presupposed 
plurality over which we quantify. Against this Westerståhl gives the following 
example: 
 
Suppose I describe a tram ride to my friend, and how at some point the tram 
stopped due to a power failure, and all passengers had to get out. I might end 
my discourse with: 
 
(10) Everyone left. 
 
It can be quite natural to assume that my discourse has built a temporary 
universe consisting of people in the tram (even if I used no expression 
denoting that set), and so (10) automatically means what I intended it to mean, 
i.e. that everyone in the tram left. (§ 4) 
 
Westerståhl then struggles with the question, whether ‘one’ in ‘everyone’ might not 
be doing the plural referential work. To save himself this issue, he could have used 
the example I brought in my paper, ‘the second contribution to the following 
exchange: “Have all students arrived?”—“No. Some are missing.”’ (p. 324). So 
despite the impression Westerståhl may unintentionally have created, I was well 
aware of this possible objection. I there classified it as a special ‘elliptic’ case, but 
given Westerståhl’s objection, I shall say a few more words about it here. 
 First, notice that this is a special specific case; even if it were a case of an 
unspecified yet presupposed domain of quantification, it would not follow that in, say, 
‘Most students have arrived’ the domain is not explicitly specified by the general 
noun ‘students’, and it would not therefore prove that my analysis is mistaken. But 
secondly, both in Westerståhl’s example and in mine, a plural referring expression 
which explicitly specifies the domain was used, albeit in an earlier sentence: 
Westerståhl’s story contains the earlier sentence, ‘all passengers had to get out’, and 
my exchange contains ‘Have all students arrived?’. Accordingly, a Gricean 
conversational maxim, Avoid Unnecessary Prolixity (Grice 1967: 27), would dictate 
that the speaker should not repeat what need not be repeated. And we should 
remember that these Gricean principles were intended to show which cases should not 
bring us to modify our semantics. The fact that no explicit plural referring expression 
is used in these ‘elliptic’ sentences is predictable on my analysis, given Gricean 
principles and the fact that the appropriate plural referring expression has just been 
used. So we can still maintain that the alleged implicit domains of quantification, 
discourse universes or ‘temporary universes’, which are ‘theoretical tools used by the 
semanticist’ (§ 4), are redundant. Moreover, both in Westerståhl’s example and in 
mine, the plurality necessary for quantification has been specified earlier in the 
discourse (passengers, students), and the common noun that usually follows the 
quantifier is absent. This supports the claim that the role of this common noun, when 
it is used, is to specify the plurality over which we quantify. For this reason, when this 
plurality has just been specified, the common noun is redundant and can be omitted. 
These ‘elliptic’ cases thus support my analysis. 
 Westerståhl proceeds to note that some sentences in natural language require 
what he calls context sets, for instance: 
 
(1) Wherever John shows up, most people tend to leave. 
 
Here, he claims, we quantify over (locations and) sets or pluralities of people in the 
vicinity of John at each place. No constituent of (1), and no token or use of ‘people’, 
refers to these context sets or pluralities, he claims, yet still these context sets are 
needed. 
 Again, even if Westerståhl were right and such examples did show that some 
sentences require a presupposed and unspecified domain of quantification (here, a 
plurality of sets or pluralities), this would not show that in ‘Some students were late’ 
the noun ‘students’ is not a plural referring expression explicitly specifying the 
domain of quantification; thus it would not prove my analysis wrong or the 
generalized quantifiers one right. But, secondly, I think it does not show what 
Westerståhl claims it does. Consider the sentences 
 
(2) Jotham loves his mother. 
(3) Every child loves his mother. 
 
While ‘his mother’ is a referring expression in (2), designating Jotham’s mother, it 
refers to nothing in (3). So do we need a special analysis of ‘his mother’ in (3), 
something like context sets of mother singletons?—of course we do not: for any 
substitution of a child’s name for ‘every child’ in (3), ‘his mother’ then refers to the 
mother of the designated child; this is how the meaning or truth conditions of (3) are 
determined. Since in (3), ‘his mother’ is anaphoric on a quantified noun phrase, it 
acquires reference only when an appropriate referring expression is substituted for the 
quantified noun. To claim that a special kind of quantification, reference or what have 
you is necessitated by ‘his mother’ in (3), would be similar to the following line of 
argumentation. Compare the formulas 
 
(4) p  q 
(5) (x)(Px  Qx) 
 
In (4),  stands for the material implication, namely, the truth-function TFTT. But, 
one might argue, since neither its antecedent nor its consequent has a truth value in 
(5), it cannot be a truth function there, and a special interpretation of  is needed in 
this case. We of course reject this argument, since for any substitution of a constant 
for the variable in the parentheses,  is interpreted as the truth function TFTT. More 
generally, parts of speech that appear within the scope of a quantifier may contribute 
to the determination of the meaning of the quantified sentence through their 
contribution to the meaning of substitution instances of that sentence. This is also the 
case with multiply quantified sentences, such as (1) or the following one: 
 
(6) Every child likes most of his classmates. 
 
Westerståhl would have us quantify in (6) over an unspecified yet presupposed set of 
context sets of classmates. My alternative explanation is as follows: ‘his classmates’ 
does not refer to anything in (6); however, for any appropriate substitution of a child’s 
name for ‘every child’, ‘his classmates’ then designates that child’s classmates, and 
the sentence is true just in case the child likes most of them. And (6) is true just in 
case every such substitution yields a true sentence. Again, this interpretation follows 
directly from the application of general rules for the interpretation of parts of speech 
within the scope of a quantified noun phrase. So I do not think that even for the more 
complex case of multiply quantified sentences did Westerståhl succeed to show that 
my rejection of implicit quantification domains does not apply.4 
 I explained in section 4 of my earlier paper on a priori grounds why natural 
language quantifiers that are one-place determiners are necessarily restricted on my 
approach. But I shall concisely repeat the main idea here. First, let us explain what 
restriction amounts to. I quote Westerståhl’s informal explanation, which opens his 
reply, and which I find no less clear or precise than any formal one: 
 
Natural language quantification is restricted, in the sense that the truth or 
falsity of a sentence like 
 
(1) Most students came to the party 
 
is independent of (a) how many non-students there were at the party, and (b) 
how many individuals in the universe of discourse are neither students nor 
party guests. That is, quantification is restricted to the set of students. 
 
On my approach, there is no universe of discourse involved in the truth conditions of 
‘Most students came to the party’, and of course no non-students are mentioned by it; 
its truth value is therefore necessarily independent of these. Quantification is thus 
necessarily restricted to the plurality of students. I am sure readers would agree that 
this semantic explanation of restriction is not technically intricate and of course makes 
any recourse to brain science redundant. 
 Westerståhl devotes §3 of his paper to proving that any natural language 
quantifier realizable on my approach can also be interpreted as a restricted binary 
quantifier, and vice versa. This, I think, is redundant, for it was one of the central 
claims of my paper. My additional claim was that the generalized quantifiers 
approach cannot explain why only these quantifiers are realized in natural language, 
while my alternative approach can. As we saw, Westerståhl indeed admits that this 
has not been explained by the former approach. He also wonders whether I could 
                                                 
4 I discuss multiply quantified sentences, bound anaphora and related issues in more detail in (Ben-
Yami 2004, Chaps. 7, 8). 
prove on my approach non-trivial facts, for instance, that the binary quantifier most is 
not definable by any unary quantifiers (§ 5). Now although I supplied a simple proof 
of that in my paper (pp. 311-312), of course when we come to unary or binary 
quantifiers, which presuppose a domain of quantification, my approach to 
quantification will not apply. It was intended to apply to natural language, and not to a 
formal system which I claim fails to capture the semantics and logic of natural 
language. A different but related and relevant question, which Westerståhl raises at 
the end of section 4, is whether it is possible to do natural language semantics on my 
approach with a formal system as powerful as model-theoretic semantics, but without 
using discourse universes etc. The reply here is affirmative, and I have mentioned in 
my earlier paper two works that do just that ((Lanzet and Ben-Yami 2004), (Lanzet 
2006)). 
 I addressed in this response only Westerståhl’s main objections and what I 
take to be misunderstandings. I thus pass over a few minor points in silence. I shall 
end with the following comment. Westerståhl interprets my remark, that ‘the ability of 
competing theories to supply an explanation [of restriction] should be a criterion for 
deciding between them’, as if I meant by it that this should be the sole criterion. (Ben-
Yami 2009: 309; Westerståhl 2010, Introduction and § 5) But this is not what I meant: 
I wrote that it should be a criterion, not the criterion; other strengths and weaknesses 
of theories should of course also be considered. Additional advantages of my 
approach were not the subject of the paper to which Westerståhl replied, but they can 
be found in (Ben-Yami 2004), where my system is developed in much more detail. I 
show there how my approach explains away an alleged ambiguity of the copulative 
structure; how it explains semantic analogies between empty singular terms and 
empty general terms; how it explains the semantic need for active–passive voice 
distinction, converse relation-terms or similar reordering devices; and more. Other 
strengths of my Aristotelian-Geachean approach are discussed in (Ben-Yami 2009a: 
§ 3), vis-à-vis plural quantification logic. A deductive system built on its basis, which 
incorporates Aristotelian logic and is not less powerful than the first order predicate 
calculus can be found in (Ben-Yami 2004: Part III) and (Lanzet 2006). The decision 
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